Abstract
Inverseness may be broadly characterized as a variety of structural organization in which a transitive, non-reflexive predication is specially marked in case a first or second person referent corresponds to a nonsubject logical role. This work seeks to bring greater clarity to the understanding of inverse languages by furnishing evidence for three points. First, an inverse system is to be distinguished from the inverse language type. Individual systems differ in degree of adherence to this type, depending largely upon their conformity to head-making (Nichols 1986). Secondly, there is no single formal behavior or set of formal behaviors found in every inverse language. For instance, not every inverse language evinces verbal direction markers or theme signs signaling the opposition of direct and inverse voices of the verb. The conformity of a language to the inverse type does not depend on its exhibiting this, or indeed, any other overt property. Rather, and thirdly, the inverse type appears to arise from a unique variety of structural organization whose primitives reside in ontological statuses (as opposed to grammatical or thematic relations). These ontological-level primitives are explained, and evidence for their grammatical reality is cited from over a half dozen genetically unrelated inverse languages.
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