Abstract
This paper considers a two-period mixed market model in which a state-owned firm and a labor-managed firm are allowed to hold inventories as a strategic device. The paper then shows that the equilibrium in the second period occurs at the Stackelberg point where the state-owned firm is the leader.
Highlights
IntroductionThe analysis of mixed market models that incorporate state-owned public firms has been performed by many researchers, such as [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16].1 these studies consider mixed market models in which state-owned firms compete with profit-maximizing capitalist firms, and do not include labor-managed firms
This paper considers a two-period mixed market model in which a state-owned firm and a labor-managed firm are allowed to hold inventories as a strategic device
The paper shows that the equilibrium in the second period occurs at the Stackelberg point where the state-owned firm is the leader
Summary
The analysis of mixed market models that incorporate state-owned public firms has been performed by many researchers, such as [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16].1 these studies consider mixed market models in which state-owned firms compete with profit-maximizing capitalist firms, and do not include labor-managed firms. The analysis of mixed market models that incorporate state-owned public firms has been performed by many researchers, such as [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16].1 These studies consider mixed market models in which state-owned firms compete with profit-maximizing capitalist firms, and do not include labor-managed firms. Mixed market models that incorporate labor-managed firms have been studied by many researchers, such as [22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34].2.
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