Intuitive Judgment and Goethe’s Ethics of Knowledge

Abstract

This chapter offers a systematic explication of two crucial notions in Goethe’s epistemology—intuitive judgment and the Urphänomen—and elaborates their environmental and ethical significance and implications. The chapter begins by offering a detailed examination of the character and procedure of intuitive judgment, one of Goethe’s most widely discussed and philosophically compelling ideas. It then moves to consider the kind of concept that intuitive judgment generates, which is identified as the Urphänomen. The chapter distinguishes the Urphänomen from other kinds of concepts, in that it is neither general (and divested of particularity), nor particular (in that it cannot be seen or pointed to). Rather, it is shown that the Urphänomen is a collaborative effort between knower and known—a claim with vast ethical and epistemological consequences. The chapter turns to explicating the consequences of Goethe’s theory of knowledge, homing in on their significance for establishing new directions in environmental ethics.