Abstract
We propose in this article an architecture called trusted timely attacks-tolerating communication architecture (3TCA) designed for mobile multihop relay (MMR) networks. The 3TCA architecture is based on trusted components providing trusted time-related and security-related services along with an intrusion-related service while guaranteeing QoS compensation. 3TCA components are implemented at access nodes such as relay stations (RSs) and multihop relay base stations (MR-BSs) in order to achieve trusted QoS-aware handover management while guaranteeing intrusion tolerance. In particular, we provide QoS guarantees in terms of delay, bandwidth and jitter for the MMR networks while addressing group mobility through performing handover disturbance compensation for mobile RSs. Meanwhile, we tolerate particular timely-based and DoS attacks through compensating their impact on the already agreed QoS level. Simulations show that adopting compensation is suited for the MMR context although it induces additional complexity.
Highlights
The last years have been marked by a growing need for ubiquitous access to multimedia and real time applications at the metropolitan scale
We introduce the intrusion tolerance concept while examining some research work, as it is applied to wireless networking and we overview the requirements for an efficient QoS provision
We propose to launch 8 parallel admission control procedures, first we update the delay value by subtracting x + del − 8y, and we subtract x + del − 7y and so on until we find a suitable route that supports an updated delay value. the choice of the value of y may be random or it may be proportional to the value of x; it will vary according to the environment conditions and the load
Summary
The last years have been marked by a growing need for ubiquitous access to multimedia and real time applications at the metropolitan scale. The fault or intrusion tolerance is achieved by setting up routing tables with multiple entries ending to specified gateways so that data which failed to reach the destination using a particular route may choose a different path This scheme can be adopted for multihop relay networks only on the backbone between the neighboring intermediate BSs (i.e., from the sender MRBS to the destination MR-BS). Authors of [14] did not consider particular QoS constraints in terms of delay, jitter or throughput in their proposed secure routing protocol Applying this scheme for multihop relay networks will not provide us with the required QoS guarantees. The relay mode is intended to be more stable than the ad hoc, sensor or mesh ones because the MR nodes relaying traffic and signalling have more computing and power capabilities and are managed by the network operator
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