Introspection

Abstract

Abstract Chapter 5 explores the epistemic role of consciousness in introspection. Section 5.1 presents a simple theory of introspection, which says that some mental states provide introspective justification that puts you in a position to know with certainty that you’re in those mental states. Section 5.2 defends the simple theory against Eric Schwitzgebel’s arguments for the unreliability of introspection. Section 5.3 motivates the simple theory on the grounds that it explains a plausible connection between epistemic rationality and introspective self-knowledge. Section 5.4 argues that all and only phenomenally individuated mental states fall within the scope of the simple theory of introspection. Section 5.5 explores the role of consciousness in explaining our introspective knowledge of what we believe. Section 5.6 concludes with some pessimism about the prospects for explaining the connection between consciousness and introspection in more basic terms.