Introspection Without Judgment

Abstract

The focus of this paper is introspection of phenomenal states, i.e. the distinctively first-personal method through which one can form beliefs about the phenomenology of one’s current conscious mental states. I argue that two different kinds of phenomenal state introspection should be distinguished: one which involves recognizing and classifying the introspected phenomenal state as an instance of a certain experience type, and another which does not involve such classification. Whereas the former is potentially judgment-like, the latter is not. I call them, respectively, reflective introspection and primitive introspection. The purpose of this paper is to argue that primitive introspection is a psychologically real phenomenon. My main argument for the existence of primitive introspection is an argument from phenomenal-concept acquisition. By assuming that the capacity to classify or recognize a phenomenal state as an instance of an experience type (e.g. pain experience) maps into one’s possession of the relevant phenomenal concept (e.g. PAIN), I argue that if all introspection involved classification, most phenomenal concepts could not be acquired. I conclude that, if we are to avoid radical nativism about phenomenal concepts, we must accept the existence of non-classificatory introspection (i.e. primitive introspection).