Abstract

If we use “introspection” just as a label for that essentially first-person way we have of knowing about our own mental states, then it’s pretty obvious that if there is such a thing as introspection, we know on that basis what we believe, and want, and intend, at least in many ordinary cases. I assume there is such a thing as introspection. So I think the hard question is how it works. But can you know that you know on the basis of introspection? Well, that all depends on how introspection works. I present one account of how introspection works and argue that on that account, you can know that you know ordinary empirical things on the basis of introspection. As far as how we know about them is concerned, there’s no principled difference between the factive and non-factive mental states.

Highlights

  • If we use ‘‘introspection’’ just as a label for that essentially first-person way we have of knowing about our own mental states, it’s pretty obvious that if there is such a thing as introspection, we know on that basis what we believe, and want, and intend, at least in many ordinary cases

  • The thought continues, if there’s a logical connection between the facts, the fact that you know that p and the fact that you know that you know that p, this might explain the apparent lack of a procedure and the apparent ease with which second-order knowledge comes when it does

  • We’re familiar with the idea that any distinctively first-personal knowledge we have of our own mental states must be restricted to the inner life

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Summary

Gibbons

For all p, if you know that p, you know that you know that p. We’re familiar with the idea that any distinctively first-personal knowledge we have of our own mental states must be restricted to the inner life Both the enthusiasm and the restriction can be motivated by thinking about a certain kind of skeptical scenario. Maybe what’s distinctive about our knowledge of our own mental states is its immunity from a certain kind of skeptical scenario. The thought continues, if there’s a logical connection between the facts, the fact that you believe that p and the fact that you know you believe that p, this might explain the apparent lack of a procedure and the apparent ease with which self-knowledge comes when it does. To the extent that the picture and the answer work, they work just as well for knowing that you know as they do for knowing that you believe

The route and the status
When justifiers are also truth makers
Objections to extending
Safety first
Transmission failure
Part II: the question
When questions are connected
Some practical cases
A theoretical case
Full Text
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