Introduction

Abstract

Abstract Since the end of World War II, much moral philosophy has been driven by the question, “What can be said in condemnation of Nazis and other moral monsters that is not merely an expression of personal preference?” Many contributors to this discussion have accepted some thing like the following stark assumption: either there is some set of moral standards binding on human beings (or rational agents) as such, or there is no rationally defensible objection to the behavior of Adolf Hitler, Pol Pot, and their like. Here the term “morality” is typically used as if it were the name of this set of universal standards (rather than a general term). Society, conscience, or religion may demand one thing. Morality may demand another. Unfortunately, all attempts to defend descriptions of these standards have faced formidable obstacles. So much so that many hearty souls—trusting philosophical argument more than their own deepest prereflective convictions—have abandoned the effort and declared the objective chimerical. Given the stark assumption, their skepticism amounts to the view that there is no more rational justification for opposing murder, torture, theft, or betrayal than there is for preferring the taste of chocolate to that of vanilla. But few are happy with this conclusion, and no one (to my knowledge) acts as if his own moral convictions were mere matters of taste.1