Introduction

Abstract

Abstract This introduction contrasts two different pictures of the relationship of virtue to human imperfection. On the first sort of picture, the only real virtue is perfect virtue, and the only right actions are perfectly virtuous ones. Any failure to meet the exacting standards of perfect virtue will amount to vice, and any less than perfectly virtuous actions will be wrong. On the second sort of picture, there can be actions that are right even if they are not maximally virtuous and there can be people who are profoundly virtuous even if they are not perfect. This book urges the attractions of a virtue ethics committed to the second sort of picture. Doing so allows it to make two major innovations: First, it will construct and defend neo-Aristotelian accounts of supererogation and suberogation. Second it will show that self-improvement itself can be morally excellent, and that the disposition to seek and engage in it, where appropriate, can itself be a virtue. The introduction lays out the plan of the book, previewing the argument for these claims.