Abstract
Abstract I discuss specialization in philosophy, and the threat it poses to understanding “how things hang together.” I illustrate the problem using naturalism, a prominent view which combines realism about the sciences with anti-realism about value. Whether this view is tenable depends on whether one can be a mathematical realist and a moral anti-realist. But nobody knows whether one can, because metaethics and the philosophy of mathematics are mutually insulated research fields. I conclude that whether one can be a moral anti-realist and a mathematical realist, or whether metaethics and the philosophy of mathematics have anything else to teach us about how things “hang together,” requires bringing the areas into meaningful contact.
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