Introduction

Abstract

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched by US President Bush in May 2003, is intended to prevent traffic in elements of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Most WMD traffic moves by sea, and the focus of the PSI is on maritime interdictions and seizures. Although the PSI has had some significant successes, it has been criticised for lacking sufficient public accountability, stretching international law to the limits, undermining the UN system, potentially limited effectiveness and being politically divisive. Moreover, Asian countries that are key to PSI's successful implementation – notably China, India, Indonesia and South Korea – have deferred active involvement despite US pressure. Options for increasing PSI participation and enhancing its effectiveness include changes to existing international law; expanding existing conventions or developing a new one; obtaining an unambiguous empowering UN Security Council Resolution; obtaining NATO endorsement; arguing pre-emptive self-defence; and building a coalition of countries willing to perform such interdictions on each other's ships and aircraft on or over their territorial seas. However, each of these options would face obstacles and limitations that must be overcome for the PSI to be fully effective.