Abstract
Close analysis of how non-state actors adapt to state collapse is critical for effective peacebuilding, development, and counter-terrorism strategies in those crises. In Somalia, the nature of state collapse has changed significantly since 1995. Armed conflict is more localised; lawlessness is better contained by local authorities; and warlords have been weakened by an emerging commercial elite whose interests lie in stability, not plunder. Risk-aversion drives political behavior and partially explains the reluctance of local elites to support a revived central government.Efforts to revive a central state in Somalia risk creating a ‘paper state’ – one which lacks a capacity to govern and is prone to police corruption, providing an environment in which terrorist networks thrive.
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