Abstract
Abstract When a subject has a phenomenally conscious experience (as of a bouncing red ball, for example), she is aware of the world as being presented in a certain way (a bouncy, reddish, roundish way in this case). Many philosophers, from Aristotle and Kant to Husserl and Sartre, have argued that in such conscious experiences, whatever the specific qualities the subject is aware of, she is also phenomenally aware of the fact that the experience is presented to her. This view is attracting a new surge of attention at the crossroads of phenomenology, analytic philosophy of mind and the philosophy of cognitive science, but also intense controversy. The book explores some of the questions running through the debate on this putative self-experience: Does it exist?, the existence question; What is it?, the essence question; What is it for?, the function question; and What else does it explain?, the explanation question. In this Introduction, we elaborate on the first two questions, and then move on to providing a brief presentation of the chapters to follow.
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