Abstract
AbstractThis introductory chapter begins with the author's evaluation of his book The Language of Thought (LOT 1). It contends that the language-of-thought hypothesis endorsed in LOT 1 was not just any old hyper-realism about the mental; it was, in particular, a species of representational theory of mind. It further says that the nearest approximation to the view of cognition that LOT 1 had in mind was perhaps the sort of computationalism that was pervasive in artificial intelligence (AI). Cognitive science did not, as it turned out, develop in the way that LOT 1 thought it would. Rather, the mainstream view, not just in AI but in philosophy and cognitive psychology, is now a kind of pragmatism: what is essential to thought is not its relation to the things in the world that it represents, but its relations to the actions (the ‘behaviours’) that it guides.
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