Introduction

Abstract

[ 2 ] asia policy Introduction Nicholas Eberstadt, Aaron L. Friedberg & Geun Lee By many measures, the U.S.-ROK alliance—formalized and underpinned through the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty signed between Seoul and Washington—qualifies as a signal historical success. After all, the proximate objective of this military alliance was to deter a second North Korean attack on South Korea (with the first such attack, in June 1950, having launched the devastating 1950–53 Korean War) and, for the five decades that the treaty has been in force, the peninsular ceasefire has steadily held, albeit at times uneasily. Moreover, this U.S. military guarantee helped to assure stability and security in the Northeast Asian region during the Cold War era, thereby facilitating South Korea’s own remarkable economic and political development. By the mid-1990s, the Republic of Korea (ROK) qualified for membership into the OECD, formally joining the world’s roster of affluent and highly industrialized constitutional democracies—an achievement that is, considering South Korea’s starting point in 1953, hard to imagine absent the strong and continuing military and political bond with the United States. Notwithstanding those past successes, the U.S.-ROK alliance is under growing strain today—and the increasingly troubled nature of the current security relationship is no secret on either side of the Pacific. Given South Korea’s tremendous relative rise in recent decades, some degree of friction and readjustment would arguably have been inevitable in this alliance. Today’s growing tensions are, however, more than a reflection of mere “structural” developments. Over the past decade, fundamental differences have emerged between Washington and Seoul over the perceived objectives of the alliance. Most critically, U.S. and South Korean policymakers now do not entirely agree on the nature and urgency of or the appropriate responses to the “North Korean threat.” Since the Mutual Defense Treaty is cast as a pact for resisting potential North Korean aggression, this fissure has potentially profound ramifications. nicholas eberstadtis Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and Senior Adviser to The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). He can be reached at . aaron l. friedbergis Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Chairman of the Pyle Center on Northeast Asia at NBR. He can be reached at . geun lee is Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University and President of the Korea Institute for Future Strategies (KiFS). He can be reached at . [ 3 ] roundtable • u.s.-rok alliance Additional disagreements, however, have arisen with U.S. attempts to re‑conceptualize the purposes of the alliance in the post–Cold War era. On the one hand, tensions have increased especially since September 11 given that Washington is proposing new options for extra-peninsular projection of U.S. military force from bases and places in South Korea. On the other hand, Seoul is insisting that the U.S. military presence in Korea should relate strictly to the defense of the ROK. No longer supported by quite the same shared sense of purpose that characterized the relationship in earlier decades, the U.S.-ROK alliance now appears to be heading into a more unhealthy and uncertain middle age. In recent years, the woes of the U.S.-ROK alliance have generated a veritableblizzardofpapersandavirtualthrongofconferenceson“rejuvenating the alliance”—efforts to little analytical or policy effect. Unfortunately, too much of this well-intended work has attempted to finesse—or paper over— existing and indeed widening differences in strategic assessments by Seoul and Washington. Ratherthanattemptingtosquarethatcircle,thisroundtableinsteadworks from a somewhat more radical analytical diagnostic: a rigorous “alternative futures” exercise on the U.S.-ROK alliance. What would it mean for South Korea, the United States, and other affected parties if the U.S.-ROK alliance did not actually exist? How would we describe the “hypothetical geography” of a Northeast Asian region identical to the one we know today, save for the absence of any defense or security relationship linking Seoul to Washington? This approach to the U.S.-ROK alliance problematik is instructive for two main reasons. First, there is an intrinsic intellectual utility to the alternative futures method: for over a generation, such exercises have been...