Introduction

Abstract

Like its predecessor (Chatterjee and Samuelson 2002), the aim of this new edition is to provide the interested reader a broad and (we hope) deep view of the way business decisions can be modelled and analyzed using game theory. The chapter contents embrace a wide variety of business functions – from accounting to finance to operations to marketing to organizational design. Moreover, specific application areas include R&D strategies, bargaining, settlement negotiations in the shadow of litigation, strategic behavior in legal settings, contractual issues in the academic labor market, auctions and competitive bidding, and experimental economics. All of these applications involve competitive decision settings – that is to say, situations where a number of economic agents in pursuit of their respective self-interests take actions that together affect all of their fortunes.KeywordsGame TheoryTransfer PriceBidding BehaviorIncomplete ContractEnglish AuctionThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.