Introduction

Abstract

Pyrrhonian skepticism is defined by its commitment to inquiry. The Greek work skepsis means inquiry. The introduction proposes that Sextus Empiricus’ legacy is that he developed an epistemology of inquiry—not as a theory of inquiry, but as a practice. Sextus provides a fresh take on contemporary debates because he approaches issues of perception, disagreement, induction, and ignorance from the perspective of inquiry. The volume’s contributions, which are summarily sketched in the introduction, address four core themes of Sextus’ skepticism: (1) appearances and perception, (2) the structure of justification and proof, (3) belief and ignorance, and (4) ethics and action. These themes are explored in some historical authors whose work relates to Sextus, including Peripatetic logicians, Locke, Hume, Nietzsche, and German idealists; and they are explored as they figure in today’s epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and ethics.