Introduction

Abstract

Abstract In this book the legitimacy of anti-dumping measures in free-trade areas is discussed. Economists argue that, generally, anti-dumping actions restrict and distort competition. In political terms, anti-dumping measures are biased in favour of a privileged interest-group: the producers. Legally, they infringe the obligation of National Treatment contained in the GATT and NAFTA. Within regional groupings anti-dumping measures contradict the guidelines of Article XXIV(8)(b) of the GATT. At the same time, they are an exclusive exercise of sovereignty and would seem to protect statehood and arguably other national interests of the importing state. The traditional economic rationale for anti-dumping measures has been the threat of international predation. A pragmatic analysis of the situation led to a somewhat different assessment. With the great increase in transnational commerce, domestic economic policies, laws, and business practices have gained an important extra-territorial impact. In the absence of any international agreement as to which domestic policies and business practices constitute restrictions of trade, anti-dumping laws have evolved as strategic tools to counteract the effects of domestic structural differences and other non-tariff barriers between commercial partners. While anti dumping actions may, indeed, protect statehood, in practice, anti-dumping laws effectively stop the entry of many otherwise reasonably priced imports from exporters incapable of predation.