Introduction

Abstract

Abstract The problem of evil is the problem of whether a good God would permit so much suffering in the world. Sterba, appealing to three exceptionless minimal components of the Pauline Principle never to do evil that good may come of it, will claim to show that the all-good, all-powerful God of traditional theism is logically incompatible with all the horrendous evil consequences that occur in our world. Swinburne will reject this argument, going on to present a theodicy of why a good God would permit such horrendous evils. Sterba and Swinburne agree that there are objective moral truths discoverable by rational reflection, and that the problem of evil cannot even arise without assuming an objective morality applicable to both God and ourselves. They both reject a ‘divine command’ theory which claims that all the fundamental moral truths are made true by the free choice of God.