Introduction

Abstract

This chapter introduces the concepts and the structure employed by this book to address three questions on corruption: Why do some developing democracies experience much higher levels of corruption than others? How does the behavior of business interest groups relate to political corruption? How do legislative institutions governing the policy process promote or restrain corruption through the rules of engagement they provide to political and business actors? It first defines the meaning of the terms “political corruption,” “corruption,” and “lobbying”, since these terms have been used to describe a wide range of behaviors. It then discusses the problem scholars face in measuring corruption, and its ramifications for any research on the topic. The second section presents the puzzle motivating this book: the wide variation in the levels of corruption experienced by countries. It analyzes the most prominent theories that have been used to explain corruption and business lobbying. This is followed by a discussion of some of the limitations faced by current theoretical and empirical approaches in understanding these phenomena. It then previews the argument that legislative institutions drive variation in corruption levels by motivating specific patterns of behavior among special interest groups. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.