Introduction to the Symposium

Abstract

In June 2009 Prime Minister Gordon Brown informed the House of Commons that he was establishing an independent Privy Counsellor Committee of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir John Chilcot. It was from the outset understood that its scope would be broad, and the period covered very long. At a news conference to launch the Inquiry on 30 July 2009 Sir John Chilcot set out the Terms of Reference for the Inquiry. It was to consider the period from the summer of 2001 to the end of July 2009, embracing the run up to the conflict in Iraq, the military action and its aftermath. We will therefore be considering the United Kingdom's involvement in Iraq, including the way decisions were made and actions taken, to establish, as accurately and reliably as possible what happened, and to identify the lessons that can be learned.1 There was no mention of a finding on the legality of the military action either in the statement of Gordon Brown or in the Terms of Reference. But it was clear to the Inquiry from the outset that it could not identify lessons to be learned if the controversy about legality under international law was ignored. There would be the fullest treatment of all the many international law issues, while emphasising procedure in decision-making relating to these, together with acknowledgment that the Inquiry was not a court of law.