Introduction to the special issue: simulation, norms and laws

Abstract

Are we satisfied with current approaches to the study of norms? Unfortunately not, as a number of questions are still open. First, a major dichotomy can be observed in the scientific treatment of norms. Theories of norms are grounded on two, unrelated notions, regularities and prescriptions. On the one hand, social scientists view norms as regularities of behaviour, supported by social expectations and possibly enforced through sanctions. On the other hand, philosophers of law and logicians focus on norms as prescriptions issued by definite authorities and enforced though institutional sanctions. Hence, a first set of questions pertaining to the connection between social norms and institutionalised laws comes forth. How can we distinguish normative behaviour (both social and legal) from normal conduct on the one hand and acquiescence under menace on the other? What are commonalities and differences between social conventions and institutional prescriptions? Regularities, or behavioural norms, are spontaneously emerging social phenomena, while, institutional prescriptions, are deliberately issued commands. Behavioural norms are often found either in the moral variant, as good or pro-social conduct, or in the statistical variant, as frequent, normal behaviours, while institutional prescriptions tend to collapse into legal norms, issued by specified authorities. Despite these differences it seems to us that the present gap between theories of social and institutional norms is neither desirable nor inevitable: social and institutional norms should be viewed as complementary phenomena, to be integrated in a common theoretical framework.