Abstract
AbstractThis chapter is a short introduction to the ways of dealing with the Liar paradox within classical logic. It distinguishes classical gap theories, classical glut theories, and weakly classical theories (a heading that includes both supervaluation theories and revision theories, in their ‘internal’ versions). It introduces some natural ‘Incoherence Principles’, jointly unsatisfiable in classical logic. The gap, glut, and weakly classical theories can be understood as different choices as to which incoherence principle to reject.
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