Introduction: The ‘graduation dilemma’ in foreign policy: Brazil at a watershed

Abstract

Brazil attracted international attention in the early 2000s as a promising emerging market, a rising power with increasing international leverage, and a key player (potentially, a leader) in international organizations and blocs. High expectations were set in the largest Latin American country, partly encouraged by the popularity of the then president, ‘Lula’ da Silva, who fostered international activism and longstanding regional and global ambitions. At the same time, as Soares de Lima and Hirst argue,1 efforts both to acquire greater international influence and to improve the country's record on poverty, inequality and political participation became facets of the same process. International expectations remained very high at the beginning of the current decade. However, the global economic crisis, shortcomings in the multilateral system, the falling of global commodity prices, slow national economic growth, corruption scandals, and social protests during Dilma Rousseff's interrupted administration (2011–2016) have cast serious doubts on those initial very positive forecasts.2 To date, it is not clear whether Brazil has been able to reconcile domestic practice and international foreign policy discourse and ambitions in difficult times; or, more concretely, whether and how, despite domestic instability and contestation, Brazil is currently able to effectively influence international negotiations and global governance mechanisms.