Introduction: Thailand’s Deep South–the dynamics of conflict and ethnicity

This study looks at the role of Thai state security forces in the Deep South across history until early 2017. These forces include the army, navy, police and paramilitaries and have been tasked with enforcing Thai state policy toward the Deep South since the centralization of power by the Siamese monarchy over this region in 1902. After the 2014 coup, the junta initiated a policy of using both repression and negotiations with insurgent groups to achieve its aims in the Deep South. Meanwhile violence has continued. The study, using historical institutionalism, argues that Thai security forces’ preference for a hard-line policy in the Deep South has resulted in a vicious cycle of tension and violence between security officials and local Malay-Muslims which has not been conducive to peace efforts in the region. Nevertheless, any durable peace will need to satisfy military perceptions of security. Yet what has been the historical trajectory of security policy in the Deep South? What has been the policy of the ruling National Council for Peace and Order military junta toward the region? What is the likelihood of the Thai junta becoming more pragmatic regarding the Deep South in the near future? This study examines these questions.

This study aims to determine how the dynamics of conflict in the community in the Mancani Village, Palopo City. The type of research used is qualitative research with a case study method or approach. The technique of determining informants was done by purposive sampling with the criteria of informants, namely the population involved in the conflict, the local government and the security forces, totaling 8 people. Data collection techniques were carried out by means of observation, interviews, and documentation. Data analysis techniques used are data reduction, data presentation, and drawing conclusions. The data validation technique used is source triangulation. The results of the study reveal that the dynamics of community conflict in Mancani Village, Palopo City, namely conflict begins with personal conflict and then spreads to group conflict, the main factor being triggered by the influence of alcohol, lack of parental guidance, juvenile delinquency, and ineffective efforts made by the government. Various efforts have been made by the government in resolving the conflict, such as structural handling and customary handling. However, these efforts have not been able to overcome the conflicts in the Mancani Village.

This paper tries to search for religious portrait that supports the process of radicalization which is potential in rising social fragmentation; and to study process and dynamics of conflicts, and ethnic, social-economic, political, and intra and inter-religious based radicalism. This study finds out that: Firstly, Surakarta has been known as burning city in political and SARA issues in Central Java and national level. Facts has shown that since 1910 this city witnessed mass riots and amok which are nuanced by ethnic, religious, and political issues. Indeed, some riots outspread their excess and influences to other cities around, such as May 1998 and October 1999 tragedies. Secondly, ideologically Surakarta is one of the well known cities as the breeding ground of radical Islamic groups, and Javanese traditional belief (Kejawen), which still firmly grasp their ancestor values influenced by both Kasunanan and Mangkunegeran kingdoms. Lastly, some religious based conflicts and violence and terrorism seem to be contemporary trend of radicalism in Solo.

This paper tries to search for religious portrait that supports the process of radicalization which is potential in rising social fragmentation; and to study process and dynamics of conflicts, and ethnic, social-economic, political, and intra and inter-religious based radicalism. This study finds out that: Firstly, Surakarta has been known as burning city in political and SARA issues in Central Java and national level. Facts has shown that since 1910 this city witnessed mass riots and amok which are nuanced by ethnic, religious, and political issues. Indeed, some riots outspread their excess and influences to other cities around, such as May 1998 and October 1999 tragedies. Secondly, ideologically Surakarta is one of the well known cities as the breeding ground of radical Islamic groups, and Javanese traditional belief (Kejawen), and they who still firmly grasp their ancestor values influenced by both Kasunanan and Mangkunegeran kingdoms. Lastly, some religious based conflicts and violence and terrorism seem to be contemporary trend of radicalism in Solo.

The incident of burning houses of Buddhist worship and destruction of ethnic Chinese dwellings in Tanjungbalai occurred on 29-30 July 2016. Local communities, regional leaders, security forces and some religious leaders considered this incident to be motivated by religious issues and ignored several other factors such as ethnicity, social political economy and so on, while many observers-academic, researchers, policy-makers, journalists, NGO workers, political commentatirs, among others- argues that religious violence analysis really motivated by material-based political interests, socio-economic reason, and others factor of secular ones and dismissed the religious framing of the violence. This research is based on Cavanaugh's theory that there is no purely religious or other ideological factor that is seen as dominant for the occurrence of violence. This article argues that religion plays a role in conflict dynamics in Tanjungbalai as an instrumental reason, but at the same time, attacks on Buddhist temples in Tanjungbalai are complex issues that do not purport to reveal the true state of affairs. What is apparent in riot in Tanjungbalai is competition from religion and secular factor including competition over public space, socioeconomic status, religious zoning are suggested as reasons why violent tension may exist in Tanjungbalai.

Seeger Lecture, Society for Ethnomusicology Virtual Meeting 2021

The study at hand focuses on youths in Thailand’s violence-ridden Deep South, since they tend to become drawn into political struggles more than other groups. Youths are not only targets of security officials but are people who represent the future of Thailand’s Deep South. Using the concept of political space from the United States’ National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the conflict transformation theory of John Paul Lederach, this study found that national security measures drawn up by the Thai state have limited the political space of youth in conflict area. The main target group of this study is youths of 15–35 years old who have sought to broaden political space with regard to social and political activities. This study shows that the Thai government has used the strategy of “Politics leading the military,” prioritizing political space rather than using force to solve problems. However, state policies were organized under a framework of security which affected the political expression of young people. Nevertheless, youths have been aware of this limitation and have thus sought to improve their strategies of broadening political space as a means of helping to create a more fear-free atmosphere to increase their influence on potential peacebuilding processes.

Sidney Jones is director of the Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC). From 2002 to 2013, she worked with the International Crisis Group, first as Southeast Asia project director, then from 2007 as senior adviser to the Asia program. Before that she worked for the Ford Foundation, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch. She is an expert on security in Southeast Asia, particularly Islamic terrorist move- ments in Indonesia. Jones has analyzed and extensively written on separatist conflicts (Aceh, Papua, Mindanao), communal conflicts (Poso, Moluccas), and ethnic conflict (Kalimantan) in Indonesia. She also has studied Islamic radicalism, producing reports on the Islamist terrorist network Jemaah Islamiyah and its operations in Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as issues of security sector reform and decentralization in Indonesia. This interview was conducted and recorded at IPAC office in Jakarta on 20 August 2019. It focuses on questions of religious extremism, political violence, and conflict dynamics in contemporary Indonesia.

Three substantial works see the Protestant and Catholic communities as being central to the conflict in Northern Ireland: John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary's Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images (1995), Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd's The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation (1996), and Fionnuala O'Connor's In Search of a State: Catholics in Northern Ireland (1993). In keeping with Jacques Lacan's emphasis on the centrality of aggression in the construction of identity, this chapter examines the literature that explains the Northern Ireland conflict in terms of communal identity and, in this process, notes the republican self-interpretation. It argues that the explanations offered are either inadequate or insufficient to effect significant change in the dynamics of the conflict and that Lacanian psychoanalysis is required to explain the conflict. McGarry and O'Leary cite the conflict between Protestants and Catholics, rather than religion and culture, as the cause of political violence, political stalemate, and political antagonism in Northern Ireland. Ruane and Todd maintain that the conflict is essentially a matter of historic communal division.

The Northwestern Frontier of China is different from the Northwestern China in that it is only a part of the Northwestern China that is close to the border of the country. The geographic space of the northwestern frontier in different periods of Chinese history has changed with the effective governance of the Chinese central government. The ethnic issues in the northwestern frontier have their basic historical background and time and space. The types of ethnic issues in China’s northwest frontier areas are not the same, but they are basically manifested in internal socio-economic and cultural development issues and external ethnic interaction issues, as well as transnational (border) ethnic issues and ethnic religious issues, such as ethnic separatism and extreme religion. Doctrine and violent terrorism are only part of it, not all of it. To this end, it is necessary to "prescribe the right medicine" for different types of ethnic problems and formulate different effective "prescriptions" to solve ethnic problems in order to realize the "Chinese dream" of harmonious socialist ethnic relations in China.

This article examines a faction of parliamentary politicians called “Wadah.” The faction is fundamentally Malay-Muslim, regionally-based in Thailand’s Deep South and has moved from party to party since its inception in 1986. The initiators of the Wadah group believe that, by assembling themselves as one cohesive group, it would enhance their bargaining power vis-à-vis the central Thai government. This article examines Wadah’s origins, growth, downfall, and semi-resurgence up until today. While Wadah became a useful organization for pushing the needs of Malay-Muslims in the Deep South, the 2004 violence undermined Wadah politicians’ support in their own constituencies. The lesson for Wadah is that the greater the magnitude of violence that occurs, the more likelihood incumbent politicians belonging to ruling coalition will see their constituents defect from them in the next general election.

The conflict between the Thai state and the Malay-Muslim insurgency in the country's Deep South is one of Southeast Asia's most persistent internal security challenges. The start of the current period of violence dates back to the early 2000s, and since then, a significant number of studies exploring the renewed escalation have been published. In this study, we argue that existing scholarship has not adequately accounted for the external environment in which political decisions were taken on how to deal with the southern insurgency. We seek to show how the internationally dominant, hegemonic security agenda of so-called non-traditional security (NTS) influenced the Thai government's approach to the conflict. Building upon the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory, we show how the insurgency became securitised under the dominant NTS narrative, leading to the adoption of harsh measures and alienating discourses that triggered the escalation of violence that continues today. The specific NTS frameworks that ‘distorted’ the Thai state's approach of one that had been informed solely by local facts and conditions were those of anti-narcotics and Islamist terrorism, albeit in different ways. Based on the findings from the case study, the article concludes with a reflection on the role of the hegemonic NTS agenda and its implications for Southeast Asian politics and scholarship.

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley, Sophia Moskalenko, and Clark McCauley, “Containing the Narrative: Strategy and Tactics in Countering the Storyline of Global Jihad,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 5, no. 1 (2010): 42–57. Ibid. Clark McCauley and Sarah Scheckter, “What's Special About US Muslims? The War on Terrorism as Seen by Muslims in the United States, Morocco, Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 11 (2008): 1024–1031. Clark McCauley, Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley, Conrad Winn, and Bidisha Biswas, “Tracking the War of Ideas: A Poll of Ottawa Muslims,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 5 (2011): 804–819. George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, United States Capitol, Washington, DC, 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html 1/27/2014. Clark McCauley, “Ideas Versus Actions in Relation to Polls of US Muslims,” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 13, no. 1 (2013): 70–76. Leuprecht et al., “Containing the Narrative” (see note 1 above). Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What Moves an Individual From Radical Opinion to Radical Action,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 1 (2014): 69–85. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). Ibid., Chapter 9: Group Competition. John Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind: An Individual Perspective (Chichester: John Wiley, 2003). McCauley and Moskalenko, “Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists” (see note 8 above). Ibid. Metin Turcan and Clark McCauley, “Boomerang: Opinion Versus Action in the Radicalization of Abu-Mulal al-Balawi,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 3, no. 1 (2010): 14–31. Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, “Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group that Remains Nonviolent,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 2 (2006): 315–334. Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, and Raven Korte, “The Impact of British Counterterrorist Strategies on Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models,” Criminology 47, no. 1 (2009): 17–45. Clark McCauley, “Group Desistance from Terrorism: A Dynamic Perspective,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 1, no. 3 (2008): 269–293. McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction (see note 9 above), Chapter 13: Martyrdom. Clark McCauley, Discussion Point: Introducing “Political Resilience” (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (NC-START), August 31, 2012), http://www.start.umd.edu/news/discussion-point-introducing-political-resilience. Additional informationNotes on contributorsClark McCauleyClark McCauley is a Professor of Psychology at Bryn Mawr College; Co-Director of the Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict; and Editor of the journal Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict.Sophia MoskalenkoSophia Moskalenko is a Social Psychologist working on questions of radicalization at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland, and is also affiliated with the Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict.

Ceasefires are often seen as a simple measure to end violence and allow more substantive negotiations to begin. Contemporary conflict resolution models thus posit the ceasefire as a basic step in the peacebuilding trajectory. Offering an in-depth analysis of Naga militancy in Northeast India, this article argues that ceasefires should rather be understood as a part of the dynamics of conflict. Northeast India is a site of protracted conflict involving multiple contestants, where Naga militant organizations play a key role. A string of ceasefires since 1997 between the Indian government and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) has contained fighting between security forces and militants, while violence has continued unabated between NSCN factions and among an array of other armed groups in the area claimed as ‘Nagalim’, with serious consequences for local communities. This study suggests that ceasefires may impact on conflict dynamics in at least three ways, all interrelated: (1) by affecting the internal cohesion of belligerent groups, (2) by affecting the operational space of armed groups, and (3) by affecting the relations between multiple stakeholders and parties to a conflict, including but not limited to the challenger(s) and the state. The study concludes that the terms of ceasefire agreements, the strategic use of ceasefires by conflict actors, and the opportunities created by a lack of effective monitoring of ceasefire ground rules has facilitated the operations of militants vying for territory, revenues from illegal ‘taxation’ and political stakes. Ceasefires have also paved the way for an escalation of factional and intergroup fighting and violent politics in Northeast India, by empowering signatory groups versus contenders as well as nonviolent actors.

In contemporary France, there are intense conflicts that involve both ethnic and religious issues. These conflicts provide an opportunity to study the many challenges involved in the construction of national communities and the governance of nation-states in the West. In the case of France, the continued exacerbation of the ethnic and religious problems is undeniably rooted in a range of factors both historical and current. However, the fundamental factor is that certain dominant ideologies and their value claims clash with the diverse and pluralistic nature of contemporary French society. To a certain extent, the disciplining on French society from these ideologies has distorted and contradicted it across multiple levels. Closely intertwined with ethnicity and religion, these issues predominantly manifest in the Muslim community. The notion of the “civic nation” in particular persistently excludes the notion of the “ethnic nation”. As a result, Muslims face identity dilemmas as an ethnic minority, leading to ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, in France, religious practices continue to deconstruct secular principles. This results in a crisis of secularism and further exacerbates the dispute between Muslims and indigenous society. These two fundamental ideologies, along with numerous associated conflicts, have profoundly influenced how ethnic and religious issues evolved in France, posing a significant challenge to France’s national identity.