Introduction: Some Issues of Newtonian Historiography

Abstract

The only way to reconcile the big-time folly of the 17th century with our 20th century small-time coneption of science is to minimise the failure and maximise the achievement of that century of genius. The humanistic effort of post-Kuhnian philosophy never really changed anything in this old basic mental strategy, which began its work even in Newton’s life with his first apologetic disciple, Roger Cotes, and went on uninterrupted through the 18th century Enlightenment idolators, through the 19th century positivists, and up to our own Newtonian-scholarship Industry. The modes of approach to the 17th century genius were always well established even before the approach was made, and could be pretty nearly predicted. Thus, even though there would be always a straight-laced Strong [11] to attack a woolly minded Burtt [1] on the issue of the relevance of metaphysics to science and mathematics, the attack would somehow miss the point, for “relevance” would for ever remain too misty a concept to get any real work done. Burtt, or F. Yates, would never even bother to argue that some metaphysics is a sine qua non of any working science and scientist, but they would not have to bother — everyone accepts this. And again, M. Hesse, [5] retracting Strong’s strategy, would vehemently defend the autonomy of science, yet who would care to question this?