Abstract

Epistemic virtues offer a promising angle for studying interaction between fields of research conventionally classified under the “sciences” and the “humanities.” Given that virtues like objectivity, honesty, and accuracy are not confined to specific disciplines, they allow for comparative historical research between scientific fields as well as for histories of transfer, borrowing, and adaptation between disciplines. Such research, however, requires ample attention to what scientists in specific settings understood epistemic virtues to mean. Although the adjective refers to their role in facilitating the pursuit of epistemic aims (knowledge and understanding of reality), epistemic virtues are often imbued with moral, social, religious, and/or political meaning. If virtues specify the character traits marking a “scientific self,” then scientific selfhood is never exclusively defined in epistemic terms.

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