Abstract
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) based on the retention times of the cells of a Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) can be utilised for the implementation of cost-efficient and lightweight cryptographic protocols. However, as recent work has demonstrated, the times needed in order to generate their responses may prohibit their widespread usage. To address this issue, the Row Hammer PUF has been proposed by Schaller et al., which leverages the row hammer effect in DRAM modules to reduce the retention times of their cells and, therefore, significantly speed up the generation times for the responses of PUFs based on these retention times. In this work, we extend the work of Schaller et al. by presenting a run-time accessible implementation of this PUF and by further reducing the time required for the generation of its responses. Additionally, we also provide a more thorough investigation of the effects of temperature variations on the Row Hammer PUF and briefly discuss potential statistical relationships between the cells used to implement it. As our results prove, the Row Hammer PUF could potentially provide an adequate level of security for Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) devices, if its dependency on temperature is mitigated, and, may therefore, be commercially adopted in the near future.
Highlights
In recent years, attacks that exploit the effects of row hammering in Dynamic Random AccessMemories (DRAMs) have gained a lot of attention
We investigate in detail how temperature affects the Row Hammer Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and whether there are potential statistical relations among the PUF cells and their values
The original Row Hammer PUF, which was introduced by Schaller et al [1], in 2017, is based on a firmware implementation that was querying the PUF during an early stage during Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)
Summary
Attacks that exploit the effects of row hammering in Dynamic Random AccessMemories (DRAMs) have gained a lot of attention. As proven by the work of Schaller et al [1], which was published in 2017, the row hammer effect can be used to enhance the security. This paper extends the work of Schaller et al, demonstrating that the row hammer effect can be utilised to provide run-time accessible cryptographic applications and improved security. The row hammer effect was first examined in detail in 2014, in a publication by Kim et al [2], in which the authors discuss the vulnerability of high-density, commodity DRAM modules to so-called disturbance errors caused by repeatedly accessing uncached memory rows. The transistor acts as a gatekeeper, regulating access to the capacitor, whose charged or discharged state indicates the logical value stored in the DRAM cell.
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