Intra-Party Factions and Coalition Bargaining in Germany

Abstract

Most formal theories of coalition formation are based on the assumption of parties as unitary and forward-looking actors who bargain over portfolios and future governmental policies in the government formation process (e.g. Laver/Shepsle 1996, Thies 2001). In this paper we relax the unitary actor assumption and theorize about the conditions under which intraparty factions play a role in coalition bargaining processes. Using a simple model we argue that the outcomes of coalition formation processes (portfolio allocation, governmental policy as stated in the coalition agreement) reflect the policy positions and intraparty strength of party factions rather than the positions of parties as unitary actors. We evaluate the argument in a case study of coalition formation in Germany in 1987/90 and 1998/2002. Party manifestos, platforms of party working groups, and formal coalition agreements are used to derive policy positions of all major parties (as unitary actors), their key factions, and future governmental policies. Using the wordscore technique (Laver/Benoit/Garry 2003), we estimate policy positions with respect to the three most important policy dimensions, the socio-economic, the social, and the foreign affairs dimension. We find support for the argument that the allocation of portfolios to members of party factions is used to enforce coalition contracts when ministerial discretion is high.