Intractable conflicts

Abstract

Many conflicts, especially intercommunal or interstate conflicts related to ethnic and religious differences, often sink into self‐perpetuating, mutually reinforcing, violent antagonisms. Such conflicts are a longstanding part of human history. There have been, however, interludes and areas where such conflicts have been absent. In the first decades after World War II, many intellectuals and political leaders regarded the ethnic and religious identities fueling such conflicts as passing out of history, even as they continued to erupt. The Cold War seemed to mask some of them, as if an ideological or class struggle were the overriding source of conflicts. The end of the Cold War has given new recognition to such communally based conflicts and to conflicts that appear intractable. The field of conflict resolution, as a set of techniques for negotiation and mediation, is not likely to be relevant for managing or resolving such conflicts. However, the field as a general approach, which offers a strategic analysis and policy, can have great relevance. How do conflicts that are becoming intractable or that threaten to become so begin to deescalate and move toward settlement? We should especially examine intercommunal conflicts—ones based on ethnic, religious, linguistic, and regional identities and groups. Of course, many such conflicts end by one side imposing its will on the other, defeating the other side, or resorting to brutal, violent repression. But even those outcomes often create the grounds for retaliation and renewed violence later, such as in Franco‐German relations between 1870 and 1945, and within contemporary Guatemala. Other conflicts end when the primary adversaries find mutually acceptable settlements that become the bases for building peaceful relations, such as in Norwegian‐Swedish, Franco‐German, and Flemish‐Walloon relations. We should be particularly interested in outcomes that are achieved through explicit negotiations or even tacit bargaining. I want to draw attention to settlements that are mutually beneficial, fair, and enduring, even though they emerge from periods of protracted struggle. Such settlements are especially difficult to achieve when the adversaries have unequal power. This is a particular problem for the field of conflict resolution. Settlements reached when the parties differ greatly in resources are likely to codify the inequalities and inequities inherent in the asymmetrical relationship. The best diplomatic or conflict resolution techniques will not alter at the negotiation table the reality on the battlefield or in the streets. Major asymmetries, therefore, are likely to lead the weaker party and often good‐hearted observers to urge an escalation of the conflict before seeking its deescalation. Indeed, many partisans argue that the other side understands only force, and therefore it is necessary to escalate the fight a little more in order to bring the adversary to reason and to negotiation. Here we want to examine the ways equitable and enduring resolutions to conflicts verging on intractability can be achieved. We consider hard cases, including ones with great asymmetries of power. We examine the role of escalating coercion as a way to move conflicts toward deescalation, settlement, and even reconciliation. Which kinds of escalation, if any, move a conflict toward resolution and which kinds exacerbate the conflict? What are the alternatives to coercive escalation in bringing a conflict to a mutually acceptable resolution?