Intra-group interactions and inter-group violence: Sikh mobilization during the partition of India in a comparative perspective

Abstract

ABSTRACTTheories of ethnic conflict posit ethnic mobilization by elites as a necessary condition for ethnic war. What is less well understood is why ethnic mobilization succeeds in some instances, but not in others. This article examines this question using a case that is yet to be systematically explored from this perspective: Sikh mobilization during the partition of British India in 1947. During the period February–July 1947, there were two clear instances in which a section of Sikh elites tried to mobilize group members. While the first attempt at mobilization in March failed to elicit sufficient mass participation, the second attempt, in July, was more effective and created the preconditions for the violence that ensued in August. What explains this variation in mobilization outcomes? We contend that this difference can be traced back to key changes in elite strategy from March to July. In March, mobilization failed because the Sikh elites who were committed to the path of violence left the onus of the mobilization on a small group of extremists and mass sentiments, ignoring serious intra-community differences based on class and caste inequalities. By contrast, in July, they emphasized the issue of land dispossession and gave credible indications of their resolve to use violence to defend individual rights to land. These actions produced greater compliance because of the specific capacity of anti-land dispossession politics to blur intra-group social inequalities and heighten inter-group tensions based on land dispossession.