Abstract
This article identifies the existence of a previously unknown but important type of self-directed political behavior by International Organizations (IOs) that I term intervention. Intervention occurs when an IO secretariat acts with the intention of altering an anticipated decision at a partially-overlapping IO in a regime complex. Intervention is a distinct type of behavior by IOs that differs from either bureaucratic competition among IOs for mandates, resources and policy influence, or cooperation to achieve joint regulatory goals and enhance performance. I probe the plausibility of intervention through an analysis of three illustrative case studies in the regime complex for food security showing self-directed political actions by the secretariats of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Food Programme (WFP) and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) directed at altering decision-making by states at the World Trade Organization (WTO). I identify three distinct intervention strategies – mobilizing states, public shaming and invoking alternative legal frameworks – in which IOs utilize their material, ideational and symbolic capabilities to influence decision-making not within their own institutions, but at other, overlapping organizations in a regime complex over which they have no direct control.
Highlights
Scholars recognize that international organizations (IOs) do not operate in splendid isolation but are increasingly embedded in “regime complexes” in which their authority partially overlaps with other IOs and international agreements in the governance of an issue-area (Raustalia and Victor 2004; Alter and Meunier 2009; Alter and Raustiala 2018)
In all of the cases analyzed in this study, intervention was unidirectional: the secretariats of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Food Programme (WFP) and OHCHR each intervened in the decision-making process at the World Trade Organization (WTO), but there is no evidence that the WTO secretariat has ever sought to intervene at the FAO, WFP or OHCHR
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the existence of intervention as a form of political behavior by IOs in regime complexes
Summary
Scholars recognize that international organizations (IOs) do not operate in splendid isolation but are increasingly embedded in “regime complexes” in which their authority partially overlaps with other IOs and international agreements in the governance of an issue-area (Raustalia and Victor 2004; Alter and Meunier 2009; Alter and Raustiala 2018). As I will show, intervention is a distinct type of IO behavior that differs from existing conceptions of cooperation and competition among IOs. Drawing on analysis of the regime complex for food security, I identify three cases of intervention by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Food Programme (WFP) and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) directed at influencing decision-making at the World Trade Organization (WTO). I contribute to the literature on IOs as independent actors in global governance by demonstrating three novel political strategies pursued by secretariats in order to influence decision-making not within their own institutions, but at other, overlapping organizations over which they have no formal control. The concluding section discusses how the concept of intervention could be applied to other regime complexes and identifies directions for future research
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