Abstract
Electric utilities can reduce the cost of generating electricity by coordinating the production and transmission of electric power. For this purpose, utilities have organized power pools. This paper proposes an approach to determine the cooperative production and transmission policies for intertemporal electricity barter. The approach is based on the theory of cooperative games. Transformation of the bargaining game into its normal form requires the generation of the Pareto optimal outcomes which may be computationally impossible in real life problems. On the other hand, direct application of fairness rules for the division of the cost savings results in conditions which are nonseparable with respect to time and this problem is thus also computationally complex. The paper proposes a hierarchical approach to solve these nonseparable bargaining problems.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
