Interpreting vs. Explaining: A Rejoinder to Robert Segal

Abstract

THANKS TO ROBERT SEGAL for his response, in which he argues that the distinction I draw between interpretation (analysis that discloses embedded assumptions and meanings that characterize the religious subject's perspective) and explanation (a causal account from the scholar's perspective) is not possible. He writes that the “religionist interpretation of religious experience is not separable from the religionist explanation of religious experience.” Meaning: the religious subject's interpretation of his experience already includes an embedded explanation of the experience, presumably in religious terms. True enough. This, however, is all the more reason why—when the scholar seeks to understand that subject's experience—she cannot begin by interposing her own explanatory theory, which in all likelihood will differ from the subject's own explanation, thereby misconstruing the original experience. The example of Sigmund Freud is apropos. According to Segal, “Freud interprets God psychologically before proceeding to account for the experience of God psychologically. Freud is . . . asserting that God—the God believed in—is really the father.” For Freud, the experience of God is explained as a manifestation of the subconscious desire for the father, whom Freud depicts as a powerful, intimidating figure who evokes fear and even “dread” (1961: 24). According to Segal, Freud's explanatory theory provides the means whereby an interpretation of a religious experience may be obtained.