Abstract

Abstract The Constitution of Seychelles requires courts, when interpreting the Charter of Human Rights, to take judicial notice of human rights treaties. However, a similar obligation is not imposed on courts when interpreting legislation. Before the case of The Anti-Corruption Commission of Seychelles v Laura Valabhji (18 December 2023), the Court of Appeal had never held that courts are obliged to interpret statutes to conform to Seychelles’ international obligations. The Court rejected a literal approach to statutory interpretation and favoured a purposive approach to justify its reliance on an international treaty when interpreting the Anti-Corruption Act. In this article, the author argues that the Court’s decision in Anti-Corruption Commission of Seychelles v Laura Valabhji has three challenges: it did not explain the meaning of international obligations; its reliance on Indian and Sri-Lankan cases as a source of common law for Seychelles ignores, not only the Interpretation and General Provisions Act, but also the distinction between foreign cases as a source of common law and foreign cases from common law countries as persuasive authorities; and finally, its failure to define ‘control’ has the effect of expanding the powers of the Anti-Corruption Commission beyond what was envisaged by the legislature.

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