Abstract

This chapter defends the thesis that medieval philosophers have a sufficiently systematic account of parts and wholes. Medieval philosophers put their distinctive imprint on the strands of mereology that emanate from Plato and, especially, Aristotle. The chapter explains why the author convinces that medieval philosophers and contemporary philosophers are not talking past one another. It presents a skeletal notion of parthood, and reasons to believe that many medieval notions of part conform to this skeletal notion of being a part of something. This common ground should enable one to evaluate medieval theories on their philosophical merits. The chapter suggests that contemporary metaphysicians might want to view medieval mereology as a model for how one can develop a comprehensive account of parts and wholes. Keywords:Aristotle; medieval mereology; medieval philosophers; metaphysicians

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