Interpretation of ambiguous trials along with reasoning strategy is related to causal judgements in zero-contingency learning.

Abstract

The dual strategy model suggests that people can use either a Statistical or a Counterexample reasoning strategy, which reflects two qualitatively different ways of processing information. This model has been shown to capture individual differences in a wide array of tasks, such as contingency learning. Here, we examined whether this extends to individual differences in the interpretation of contingency information where effects are ambiguous. Previous studies, using perceptually complex stimuli, have shown that the way in which participants interpret ambiguous effects predicts causal judgements. In two studies, we attempted to replicate this effect using a small number of clearly identifiable cues. Results show that the interpretation of ambiguous effects as effect present is related to final contingency judgements. In addition, results showed that Statistical reasoners had a stronger tendency to interpret ambiguous effects as effect present than Counterexample reasoners, which mediates the difference in contingency judgements.