Interplay between Competing Policy Regimen in Supply Networks

Abstract

Competing policy regimen may arise owing to the incompatibility of incentives between either a local state and a federal government, or between two different government jurisdictions across which supply networks operate. Traditional studies of supply chain dynamics typically explore the impact of policies as standalone instruments. This research explores how simultaneous implementation of competing policy regimen, and their interplay, can impact the supply dynamics between agricultural producers and customers. Our work is motivated by the federal/state dissonance in the case of agriculture supply chains in India. In this case alternative and simultaneous policy interventions, ostensibly aimed at transforming production and distribution, lead to shifts in the bargaining power of producers, intermediaries and customers, with counter-intuitive and competing outcomes. We conclude this paper by pointing to the implications of competing policy regimen, and their interplay, for the field of production and supply chain management research.