Internationalization and the Discursive Legitimation of the Democratic Nation State

Abstract

The literature on globalization and the democratic nation state is dominated by a crisis diagnosis that holds economic and political internationalization responsible for the waning state capacity in recent decades (Keohane and Milner 1996; Kahler and Lake 2009). Bypassed by global networks of wealth, power and information, the state is arguably losing its sovereignty, hollowed out and no longer able to assume its core responsibilities. This development — which is presumably ‘voiding of meaning and function the institutions of the industrial era’ (Castells 2004, 419) and the representative institutions of liberal democracies — has also ushered in a crisis of legitimacy according to pessimistic observers. While others are more sanguine about the erosion of state power (Rieger and Leibfried 2003; Leibfried and Zurn 2006) and legitimacy (Majone 2001a; Moravcsik 2005; Schneider et al. 2010), there is widespread agreement that the democratic nation state is no longer the only relevant player in a globalized and interdependent world (Zurn 1998; Albrow 2003; Hurrelmann et al. 2007). It is therefore indeed plausible to surmise that the growing prominence of international organizations and regimes in the evolving ‘post-national constellation’ (Habermas 2001) affects the degree and foundations of state legitimacy.