Abstract

Sectarian violence has risen phenomenally in Pakistan over the past two decades. It has extended beyond sporadic clashes over doctrinal issues between Sunnis, who constitute 90 percent of the world's Muslims and 75-85 percent of Pakistanis, and Shi'is, who constitute 15-25 percent of Pakistanis, and metamorphosed into political conflict around mobilization of group identity.1 It has developed political utility, and militant organizations that champion its cause operate for the most part in the political rather than religious arena. The principle protagonists in this conflict are the Sunni Pakistan's Army of the Prophet's Companions (Sipah-i Sahaba Pakistan, SSP, established in 1984) and Pakistan's Shi'i Movement (Tahrik-i Jafaria Pakistan, TJP, formed in 1979) and its militant off-shoot, Army of Muhammad (Sipah-i Muhammad, SM, formed in 1991). They have waged a brutal and bloody campaign to safeguard the interests of their respective communities. Assassinations, attacks on mosques, and bomb blasts claimed 581 lives and over 1,600 injuries between 1990 and 1997.2 One incident, a five day war involving mortar guns, rocket launchers, and antiaircraft missiles in a hamlet in northwest Pakistan in 1996, alone claimed over 200 lives and left several times that number injured.3 The escalating violence cast a somber mood on the celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of Pakistan's independence, which took place hours after a heated debate in the parliament over a new antiterrorism law that was introduced to combat the problem. The conflict has had a debilitating effect on law and order, undermined the national ethos and the very sense of community in many urban and rural areas, and complicated democratic consolidation. Sectarianism in the Pakistani context refers specifically to organized and militant religiopolitical activism, whose specific aim is to safeguard and promote the sociopolitical interests of the particular Muslim sectarian community, Shi'i or Sunni, with which it is associated. Its discourse of power promises empowerment to that community in tandem with greater adherence to Islamic norms in public life, as the religious sources and authorities of that community articulate them. These goals are to be achieved through mobilization of the sectarian identity in question and the marginalization of the rival sectarian community, largely through prolific use of violence.

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