Abstract
North-Sea herring is a transboundary resource,shared by the EU and Norway. The purpose ofthis paper is to investigate how the harvestsor total allowable catch quotas (TACs) for thisspecies should be divided between these twojurisdictions so that both parties aresatisfied. We apply a discrete-timegame-theoretic model in which we show that theEU should be allocated more than half of theTAC even if the EU has higher harvesting costs.This result is due to the distribution patternof the herring, with a larger share of herringlocated in the EU zone. However, we find thataccording to the Nash bargaining solution, thecurrent sharing allocates too large a share tothe EU.
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