Abstract
Current states face challenges from other states and secessionist movements, and no moral theory exists to evaluate these conflicting claims. One step towards a theory is to evaluate international law on territory, specifically as articulated through decolonisation. I argue that international law does not provide a plausible moral theory of territory because the principles of territorial integrity and uti possidetis cannot coherently coexist with the principle of self‐determination. I suggest that philosophers must choose between viewing territory as an expression of national self or as a property right, or else develop a third view from sources beyond current international law.
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