Abstract
AbstractThis article investigates the case of Libya; the way the International Criminal Court responded to it; what went wrong; and what the Court could learn from the case for its future. It attempts to show that the regime change strategy followed in Libya jeopardized the international criminal justice mandate of the Court, created a failed state conundrum, and rendered the Court's intervention counterproductive. Also, in cases like Libya, where judicial intervention sits alongside military intervention, it is difficult for the Court to claim jurisdiction independent of untamed realpolitik while finding the right constituency, which is an urgent issue that remains unsolved. This research concludes that only a dispute settlement approach oriented towards a peacemaking mandate, and its incorporation into the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute, can protect the Court's independence and international criminal justice promises regarding the different limitations the Court faces.
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