Abstract

This article argues that the forces which shape how the EU engages with international financial governance are changing and that the implications for the EU’s ability to impose its preferences internationally are significant. It suggests that this change is being driven by two related factors. First, the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), with their distinct incentives, preferences and powers, have recently come to prominence in international financial governance. Second, as international financial governance pivots from being preoccupied with standard setting to becoming concerned with operational matters, there is greater potential for influence to be exerted by administrative actors such as the ESAs. This article uses the European Securities and Markets Authority—which is the most active ESA internationally—as a case study for examining the implications of the availability of a technocratic administrative channel through which the EU can engage with international financial governance. It also offers some predictions as to the implications of the Brexit decision for the ESAs as international actors and for the UK’s interaction with international financial governance.

Highlights

  • This article argues that the forces which shape how the EU engages with international financial governance are changing and that the implications for the EU’s ability to impose its preferences internationally are significant

  • This article uses the European Securities and Markets Authority—which is the most active European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) internationally—as a case study for examining the implications of the availability of a technocratic administrative channel through which the EU can engage with international financial governance

  • It can be predicted reasonably safely that the nature of the UK’s influence on international financial governance will change on exit from the EU. This will be in no small part because the UK will no longer be represented on the EU’s European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), which are becoming increasingly influential on international financial governance

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Summary

Situating the Analysis

Inquiry into international financial governance falls primarily within the fields of international financial law and of international and comparative political economy, discussions typically identify a scarcity of scholarship.. The international political economy and comparative political economy literature provides tools of analysis for examining the power dynamics of international financial governance and how different preferences are imposed.. The international political economy and comparative political economy literature provides tools of analysis for examining the power dynamics of international financial governance and how different preferences are imposed.14 It sheds light on the context in which the ESAs operate. Here the international political economy literature provides an important insight It posits that administrative agencies can shape and diffuse preferences by supporting the ‘regulatory capacity’ of the state—or the state’s ability to achieve desired outcomes through the adoption, monitoring, and enforcing of rules.. It draws on a composite literature to support its examination of how the ESAs’ powers, preferences, and incentives may lead to change and of how the effectiveness of international financial governance more generally may be affected

The Context
The ESAs and International Financial Governance
Aligned Incentives and Powers?
ESMA Incentives and Powers
Equivalence Decisions
Financial Reporting and the IFRS Foundation
IOSCO and International Financial Market Standards and Supervision
The Impact of Brexit on the ‘Agencification’ of EU Financial Governance
An Assessment
Full Text
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