International evidence on the monitoring role of foreign institutional investors in corporate investment efficiency

Abstract

PurposeThis study examines whether and how the legal origin of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) impacts corporate investment efficiency.Design/methodology/approachThe study employs a large panel dataset of firms from 32 non-USA countries from 2005 to 2018. Financial and institutional ownership data are obtained from the COMPUSTAT Global and Public Ownership databases in S&P Capital IQ, respectively. The study employed ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with year and firm fixed effects. In addition, two-stage least squares with instrumental variable regression (2SLS-IV) and propensity score matching (PSM) approaches were employed to address the potential endogeneity.FindingsThe findings of this study suggest that common- and civil-law FIIs differ in their monitoring capabilities to promote investment efficiency. The authors find evidence that increased equity ownership by common-law FIIs, not civil-law investors, strengthens the investment-Q sensitivity, resulting in higher investment efficiency. Consistent with the monitoring and information channel, the results further indicate that the positive impact of common-law FIIs on investment efficiency is stronger in host environments susceptible to agency conflicts and information asymmetry.Originality/valueThis study offers novel evidence on the heterogeneous monitoring role of FIIs with regard to their home countries' legal origins and their impact on investment efficiency in an international context.