Abstract
States employ international economic institutions as formal mechanisms in resource related conflict management. It is little known that states incorporate water resource management treaties in regional trade agreements (REIs) to jointly manage (1) the multifaceted use of rivers and (2) the territorial implications of rivers as borders. Both can lead to political tensions. I evaluate institutional effectiveness, through REI institutional design, in militarized interstate conflict. The role of trade institutions in geo-politics is a broad theme addressed. African dyads, REIs and conflict from 1950 to 1996 are the focus. I test the liberal hypothesis that institutions diminish the likelihood of militarized interstate conflict. Findings suggest allies that share memberships in REI water treaties with provisions for territorial boundary issues are more likely to fight than are other states. This relationship is weak, however, lending support to realist claims.
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