Abstract
In “Judicialization of the Sea: Bargaining in the Shadow of UNCLOS,” Sara Mitchell and Andrew Owsiak make a valuable contribution to an expanding body of scholarship that considers whether and how international courts have out-of-court “shadow effects.” The authors argue that, in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regime, the threat of binding international dispute settlement (IDS)—which entails high costs for states—encourages rational potential litigants to settle out of court through other peaceful and less costly IDS mechanisms. In this essay, I challenge the narrow focus of Mitchell and Owsiak's analysis, considering the diverse aims and processes of judicialized international cooperation in two key ways. First, the authors’ focus on peaceful IDS as the sole outcome of interest overlooks other important cooperation goals driving judicialization and delegation to international courts. An emphasis on out-of-court IDS, even when achieved peacefully, can actually undermine other objectives for judicialized international cooperation, including the development of international law and greater compliance with international law. Second, Mitchell and Oswiak's theoretical mechanism assumes that an international court contributes to its out-of-court influence through its case law, but this discounts how international courts can engage in a range of out-of-court, non-adjudicative activities that can affect potential litigants’ cost-benefit analyses regarding judicialized versus non-judicialized IDS. Indicating its preference for increasing its “direct effects” through adjudicating disputes, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has developed capacity-building and training programs to encourage judicialized IDS under UNCLOS and states’ litigation at the ITLOS. Overall, I highlight how there is a broad range of actors and processes underpinning international courts’ out-of-court effects, and how these actors and processes can work towards multiple, at times conflicting, aims for judicialized international cooperation.
Highlights
In “Judicialization of the Sea: Bargaining in the Shadow of UNCLOS,” Sara Mitchell and Andrew Owsiak make a valuable contribution to an expanding body of scholarship that considers whether and how international courts have out-of-court “shadow effects.”[1]. The authors argue that, in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regime, the threat of binding international dispute settlement (IDS)—which entails high costs for states—encourages rational potential litigants to settle out of court through other peaceful and less costly IDS mechanisms
Mitchell and Oswiak’s theoretical mechanism assumes that an international court contributes to its out-of-court influence through its case law, but this discounts how international courts can engage in a range of out-of-court, non-adjudicative activities that can affect potential litigants’ cost-benefit analyses regarding judicialized versus non-judicialized IDS
Mitchell and Owsiak argue that the credible threat of international adjudication—facilitated by states’ Article 287 declarations under UNCLOS—reduces conflict and promotes bilateral cooperation through other, less costly means of peaceful IDS
Summary
In “Judicialization of the Sea: Bargaining in the Shadow of UNCLOS,” Sara Mitchell and Andrew Owsiak make a valuable contribution to an expanding body of scholarship that considers whether and how international courts have out-of-court “shadow effects.”[1] The authors argue that, in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regime, the threat of binding international dispute settlement (IDS)—which entails high costs for states—encourages rational potential litigants to settle out of court through other peaceful and less costly IDS mechanisms. The authors’ focus on peaceful IDS as the sole outcome of interest overlooks other important cooperation goals driving judicialization and delegation to international courts. Indicating its preference for increasing its “direct effects” through adjudicating disputes, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has developed capacity-building and training programs to encourage judicialized IDS under UNCLOS and states’ litigation at the ITLOS. I highlight how there is a broad range of actors and processes underpinning international courts’ out-of-court effects, and how these actors and processes can work towards multiple, at times conflicting, aims for judicialized international cooperation
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