International climate policy dilemmas: Examining effective carbon tariff and cap-and-trade regulation from a sustainable insurance perspective

Abstract

This paper introduces a contingent claim model, offering a financial perspective on the global climate policy challenge. The model prioritizes the use of carbon tariffs to prevent carbon leakage and cap-and-trade initiatives to incentivize carbon emission reductions. In this model, manufacturers in an exporting country's supply chain collaborate with a life insurance company to acquire carbon allowances through the cap-and-trade mechanism. The importing country enforces carbon tariffs to protect its import-substitution industries and to prevent carbon leakage, assessed by the effective carbon tariff rate. Our findings show that increasing carbon tariffs on final products and intermediate goods reduces equity for both the life insurance company and the importer but strengthens carbon tariff protection. Conversely, a stricter regulatory cap within the exporting country's cap-and-trade system bolsters equity for the life insurance company and the importer but weakens carbon tariff effectiveness in the importing country. This dilemma underscores the urgent need for global collaboration in managing carbon emissions. Our research highlights the complex challenges of global climate policies. It is suggested to foster efficient and sustainable international cooperation in shaping climate policies to address these challenges.