Abstract

Despite well-developed repository programs in several countries, the vast majority of states continue to struggle developing and implementing plans to dispose of spent fuel and high level waste produced by nuclear power programs. The lack of spent fuel management options strains the credibility of the nuclear community and undercuts public and political acceptance for current and future nuclear activities. It is unethical, irresponsible and ultimately unsustainable to push the problem onto future generations. It is also a proliferation and security issue. Cooperative networks and regional frameworks for spent fuel storage and disposal could be a productive way to address these problems, particularly in Asia where the need is urgent and growing, and elsewhere. Such partnerships can enhance regional transparency and flexibility as well as improving global security and fortifying nonproliferation. However, the possibility of multinational options should not be used as an excuse for countries to neglect domestic responsibilities; all countries must have a national spent fuel management program. Conversely, national programs should not oppose concerted exploration of multinational approaches.

Highlights

  • The lack of spent fuel management options strains the credibility of the nuclear community and undercuts public and political acceptance for all nuclear activities

  • The lack of a repository program strains the credibility of the nuclear community and undercuts public and political acceptance for all nuclear activities

  • Many countries facing storage and final disposal siting challenges have an interest in cooperative approaches to spent fuel management

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Summary

Spent Fuel Disposal Challenges

Thirty-one countries plus Taiwan operate nuclear power plants; sensitive fuel cycle capabilities are concentrated in fewer than ten of those. Security/Nonproliferation: Spent nuclear fuel needs to be stored for extended periods of time until the fuel has cooled sufficiently before repositories can begin accepting it – perhaps 40 years or more.[6] In addition, increasingly high burn-up fuel and large dry storage canisters make moving spent fuel stored in such canisters problematic in the short to medium term because the allowable thermal and radiation limits for transportation can be substantially lower than the limits for storage, requiring an extended period of aging before the canisters have cooled down enough to be moved. This does not obviate the need for a repository and reprocessing can produce separated plutonium that might be acquired by non-state actors for use in nuclear explosive devices or diverted into illicit state-run nuclear weapons programs

Cooperative Approaches in Theory and Practice
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