International and National Security in the World Community in the Twenty-First Century: Outlines of New Realities

Abstract

The turns of centuries and even millennia are naturally associated in public opinion with fundamental changes in various social spheres. Therefore, one should expect on the threshold of the twenty-first century that the world order that was established after the Second World War and ensured a more or less stable world community for several decades should change. As a result, the paradigm of international and national security that was dominant throughout this historical period has ceased to “work.” Many analysts see the tragic events of September 11, 2001 as a historical watershed in the transition from one world order to another. Actually, such an assessment is surely only a metaphor. Global changes on this scale have always occurred over long periods of time. Therefore it would be fair to speak about the contemporary stage as the beginning of a transition from one world order to another. The transformation of the world from bipolar (the U.S. and NATO on the one hand, and the USSR and Warsaw Pact on the other) to monopolar, in which just one superpower—the U.S.—dominates is considered the fundamental reality underlying the current change in the world order. In fact, this is a superficial explanation for a variety of complex processes that are occurring in the modern world. The American doctrine of punishment after September 11 was conceived on the basis of this simplistic conception. Despite the success of U.S. military action in Afghanistan, the strategic perspective of this doctrine has been the source of much skepticism around the world. Speaking about the monopolar world, it is also necessary to remember that in critical situations the force ratio between nuclear powers will be determined not only by (and in some cases not so much by) economic potential, but also by the presence of warheads and means of transporting them into enemy territory. And if during the 1950’s there were serious discussions on the governmental level about the issue of the legitimacy of the use of 200–300 warheads, now it is quite obvious that the use of one single warhead could be catastrophic even for larger countries. In my opinion, it is more correct to say that the world order varies in connection with changes in the very status of the power center in the system of modern international relations, and, I would argue, by virtue of changes in the very conception of “power center.”